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Abstract. This article starts from the assumption that there are various innate contributions to our
view of the world and explores the epistemological implications that follow from this. Speciﬁcally,
it explores the idea that if certain components of our worldview have an evolutionary origin, this
implies that these aspects accurately depict the world. The simple version of the argument for this
conclusion is that if an aspect of mind is innate, it must be useful, and the most parsimonious
explanation for its usefulness is that it accurately depicts the world. There are a number of
important criticisms of this argument. These include the idea that evolutionary justiﬁcations are
circular, that evolved mental content and principles are not necessarily accurate, and that, if the
argument is taken seriously, it has some highly dubious consequences. These criticisms necessitate
various qualiﬁcations to the initial argument. Nonetheless, it is argued that, in some cases,
important conclusions can be drawn about the world from an analysis of evolved contributions to
our view of the world. An evolutionary approach cannot provide an ultimate justiﬁcation for any
belief; however, in certain circumstances, it supports the conclusion that a given belief is a rea-
sonable ﬁrst approximation. To the extent that innate content and principles pertain to topics in
metaphysics, they can be viewed as a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge.
Introduction
Origins of man now proved. Metaphysics must ﬂourish. He who
understands baboon would do more toward metaphysics than Locke.
(Darwin 1987: D26, M84)]
Our instruments of knowledge – our senses, our brains, our linguistic
abilities – were not put in place in order to give us a disinterested picture
of reality, but to help us to survive and reproduce. (Ruse 1990, p. 105)
The subject matter of this article is captured by the following questions:
Does the fact that certain tendencies of belief have an evolutionary origin
provide any reason to think that these beliefs are accurate? Can evolutionary
theory provide a solution to the problem of induction or justify belief in an
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external world or in other minds? Can innate mental content and principles
related to such metaphysical topics as causation, space, and time tell us any-
thing about these topics? In short, do ‘innate ideas’ constitute a naturalistic
source of metaphysical knowledge? If I had to answer either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to
these questions, and was allowed to say no more, I would be tempted to answer
‘no’. This would possibly be closer to the truth than the aﬃrmative response. In
the following pages, however, I will aim at a more nuanced answer, an answer
that, although perhaps closer to the negative than the aﬃrmative, does allow
some tentative metaphysical conclusions to be drawn from innate mental
content and principles.
The article begins with an outline of the argument that evolved innate ideas
constitute a source of knowledge, following which I consider some of the major
criticisms of this argument. In the course of this analysis, I attempt something
that, in light of these important criticisms, might seem somewhat foolhardy: I
mount a defence of the notion that, in certain circumstances, it is possible to
derive knowledge from the fact that certain tendencies of belief have an innate
basis. Criteria are provided for judging when it is appropriate to argue from
innateness to approximate truth. The overall conclusion is that evolutionary
theory cannot provide an ultimate justiﬁcation for any belief, but that in cer-
tain cases, the theory can bolster our conviction that a given belief is a rea-
sonable ﬁrst approximation. Furthermore, an evolutionary perspective helps
judge when appeals to intuition are justiﬁable and when they are not, helps set
appropriate standards of evidence for diﬀerent philosophical positions, and
helps set the agenda for philosophy.
Before going any further, several points are worth clarifying. The ﬁrst is an
issue of terminology, speciﬁcally, the meaning of the phrase ‘innate ideas’. The
debate over innate ideas originally centred on the question of whether certain
aspects of mental content (in particular, concepts and beliefs) are innate.
However, the debate subsequently divided into two separate questions: whe-
ther there is any innate mental content (as opposed to innate content-free
processing abilities), and whether there are any innate domain-speciﬁc mech-
anisms (as opposed to innate general-purpose mechanisms). Discussions of
innate ideas commonly focus both on beliefs and on belief-producing mecha-
nisms (although unfortunately, the distinction is not always made explicit). To
maintain continuity with the earlier discussion, I adhere to the same conven-
tion and include within my purview concepts (e.g., cause and object), beliefs
(e.g., belief in a mind-independent external world), and belief-producing
mechanisms (e.g., faculties of causal reasoning, inductive reasoning, and rea-
soning about minds). The second matter to clarify concerns the justiﬁcation of
claims to innateness. For the purposes of this article, I simply assume without
comment that certain concepts, beliefs, and mechanisms have an evolutionary
origin. Although some evidence is supportive of this view, the issue is by no
means settled. Therefore, the ultimate worth of this article is inevitably linked
with the outcomes of subsequent research regarding the evolutionary origin of
the aspects of mind in question.
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Evolutionary theory and the justiﬁcation of knowledge
According to Descartes (1641/1986), innate ideas were implanted in the mind
by God and must be accurate for God would not deceive. The question under
examination here is whether a similar argument can be derived from evolu-
tionary theory, by substituting natural selection for God. That is, if we accept
that a given example of innate mental content is a product of natural selection,
do we then have any assurance that it is accurate? And if we accept that a given
belief-producing mechanism is a product of natural selection, do we then have
any assurance that the general principles underlying this mechanism are
accurate? Some evolutionary epistemologists have suggested that we do (e.g.,
Derksen 1993). The general position is captured in the dictum: ‘Natural
selection would not have left us with eyes that regularly misled us’ (Campbell
1987, p. 151).
My ﬁrst sketch of the evolutionary argument (EA) is as follows (as you notice
some of its weaknesses, I would ask for your patience – qualiﬁcations are pro-
vided later): Any innate mental content or principles are likely to be the product
of natural selection. If innate contributions to our representation of the world
were not accurate, they would not have been useful and would not have been
selected. The fact that they were selected gives us some assurance that they are
accurate depictions of the world. It indicates that they cannot be too radically
mistaken, at least not in any biologically relevant way. The empiricists and
logical positivists argued that only concepts that had their origin in experience
could be considered meaningful (Hume 1739/1978; Carnap 1967). However,
from an evolutionary psychological perspective, our beliefs are not shaped solely
by sensory experience. They are also shaped by the ‘experience’ that constitutes
the evolutionary history of the species, via certain innate tendencies of the mind.
These innate contributions can be viewed as a naturalistic source of knowledge,
alongside the evidence of the senses. There is no reason to think that the evidence
of the senses is necessarily any more accurate than that of any innate contri-
butions. Both are means by which information can be encoded in the nervous
system. Therefore, innate mental content and principles can be viewed as a
naturalistic source of knowledge. Some of this content pertains to topics in
metaphysics, including metaphysical realism, the existence of other minds,
causation, space, and time (Stewart-Williams 2003, 2004; Stewart-Williams and
Podd, in press). Where this is the case, and assuming the validity of the EA, this
content constitutes a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge.
If this argument is accepted, it has some important consequences. First, the
EA provides an answer to the radical sceptic or solipsist, who denies the
existence of an external world. There is some reason to believe that the belief in
an objective, mind-independent external world traces to innate aspects of mind
(Stewart-Williams 2003). Nothing in our sensory experience contains the idea
that there is a mind-independent external world; all that we experience are
ﬂeeting and fragmented sensory impressions. But our minds go beyond the
evidence, and interpret these impressions as signs of a stable external world.
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The idea of a mind-independent world is not derived from sensory experience.
Instead, it must be a consequence of the innate design of our minds. The fact
that any normal mind automatically assumes an objective and mind-indepen-
dent external world may count as proof that such a world does exist. We
evolved a mind/brain that creates a sense of an objective, mind-independent
external world because this tendency generally contributed to the persistence of
the genetic material that gave rise to the tendency. In what kind of world would
this tendency be biologically advantageous? It would be advantageous in a
world that genuinely exists beyond our ﬂeeting sensory impressions. The fact
that this tendency evolved indicates that it was useful, and the simplest
explanation for its usefulness is that it is accurate.
The capacity for inductive reasoning provides another example. According
to Kornblith (1993), inductive reasoning is a native inferential tendency, and is
eﬃcacious because the structure of our minds dovetails with the structure of
the reality of which our minds are a part. His view is that ‘our inductive
inferences are tailored to the causal structure of the world’ (p. 91). The
strongest conclusion that might be drawn here is that an evolutionary justiﬁ-
cation of inductive reasoning solves Hume’s problem of induction. If induction
did not generally work, the capacity for inductive inference would not have
evolved; it has and therefore it does. A similar argument can be constructed for
abductive inference (Carruthers 1992).
Many other examples can be provided. Stewart-Williams and Hill (article
submitted for publication) argued that the capacity for causal cognition is a
product of natural selection. If causal cognition does indeed have an evolu-
tionary origin, this would argue for the utility of this tendency and therefore its
accuracy. Similarly, it has been argued that the capacity to construe other
people as possessing minds (a capacity known as ‘theory of mind’) has an
evolutionary origin (Baron-Cohen 1995; Stewart-Williams and Podd, in press).
If this were the case, it would argue that the capacity was useful, and its use-
fulness would in turn argue that it is related to the reality it aims to represent.
Thus, an evolutionary perspective provides a solution to the long-standing
philosophical problem of justifying a belief in other minds. Furthermore, this
perspective may have implications for the question of consciousness in non-
human animals. It has been suggested that theory of mind was selected not only
for understanding other humans but also for understanding some non-human
animals, including predators and prey (Mithen 1996). If attributing mind, be-
liefs, and desires to non-humans – in particular closely related ones – was useful
in our evolutionary history, then this provides some reason to think that the
assumption that non-humans possess such states is accurate. A ﬁnal example
concerns our understanding of space and time. As Hahlweg and Hooker
(1989a) noted, if ‘an organism was endowed with a space–time framework
which did not lead to a suﬃciently truthful representation of the environment,
then this organism would not survive and would leave no oﬀspring’ (p. 28).
Ergo, our survival argues for the accuracy of our mental representations of
space and time.
794
It is important to emphasize that, although the EA applies to any innate
beliefs, it does not apply to speciﬁc beliefs produced by innate belief-producing
mechanisms. For instance, even if we agreed that the capacity for causal rea-
soning is innate, we cannot assume that every causal belief a person ever forms
or acquires is accurate (although presumably these beliefs must be accurate
enough often enough to enhance ﬁtness). Nonetheless, the EA may provide
support for the implicit concepts and general principles underlying this faculty
– that is, the concept of cause and the notion that some events cause or produce
other events. In other words, the existence of an evolved faculty of causal
reasoning would not justify speciﬁc causal beliefs, but it might justify a realist
position on the issue of causation. Similarly, if theory of mind has an evolu-
tionary origin, this would not imply that every attribution of a belief or desire
to another individual is accurate. However, it might justify the more general
belief – implicit in the operation of theory of mind – that other people do
possess minds. The EA only applies to innate content and the implicit prin-
ciples underlying innate psychological mechanisms. As such, the fact that more
than half of Americans believe that extraterrestrials live among us is not a
threat to the EA, and nor are the errors in reasoning that psychologists have
shown can be evoked in certain situations (e.g., Kahneman et al. 1982). These
beliefs and judgements may derive from innate belief-producing mechanisms,
but they are not themselves innate. As such, they are beyond the scope of
the EA.
In summary, according to the EA, an analysis of the innate contributions to
our construal of the world is a potential source of knowledge. The basis of this
argument is that these contributions were selected in the process of our evo-
lution, and that this vouches for their relative accuracy. Furthermore, to the
extent that our innate ideas relate to topics in metaphysics, we can view them as
a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge.
Meeting the critics
The EA has an initial appeal. However, important criticisms can be levelled at
evolutionary approaches to the justiﬁcation of knowledge. In this section, I will
consider three: the EA is circular, innate content and principles are not nec-
essarily accurate, and the EA has certain implausible implications, for instance,
supporting the existence of objective moral truths and objective aesthetic
truths.
Evolutionary justiﬁcations are circular
Many philosophers have argued that appeals to evolution (or science in
general) in answering epistemological questions are circular (Putnam 1983;
Stroud 1985; Bradie 1986; Clark 1987). According to this view, the appeal to
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evolutionary theory in justifying the accuracy of innate mental content and the
principles underlying innate mechanisms fails because evolutionary theory it-
self presupposes the very assumptions that it is used to justify. As an example,
consider the evolutionary justiﬁcation of induction. This involves justifying
induction with reference to a theory that is itself justiﬁed with inductive
arguments. Quine (1975) made this point well. He asked why our inductions
tend to come out right, and found an answer in Darwin: ‘Creatures inveterately
wrong in their inductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die
before reproducing their kind’ (Quine 1969, p. 126). This has sometimes been
mistaken for an attempted evolutionary justiﬁcation of induction (see, for
example, Stich 1990). However, Quine did not maintain that the EA could
defeat the sceptic.
I am not appealing to Darwinian biology to justify induction. This would
be circular, since biological knowledge depends on induction. Rather, I
am granting the eﬃcacy of induction, and then observing that Darwinian
biology, if true, helps explain why induction is as eﬃcacious as it is.
(Quine 1975, p. 70)
As this quotation indicates, an evolutionary explanation for the origin of
inductive reasoning must be distinguished from an evolutionary solution to the
philosophical problem of induction. The former may be viable, but the latter
fails because it rests on a circular argument. It seems, then, that Darwin has no
answer for Hume. But can he defeat Descartes’ demon? As mentioned, the
tendency to interpret sensory experience as revealing an external world may be
a product of natural selection. According to the EA, the fact that this tendency
was selected indicates that it was genetically useful, and the simplest expla-
nation for its usefulness is that it is accurate. However, like the evolutionary
solution to the problem of induction, this argument is plagued by circularity.
As with science in general, the theory of evolution presupposes the existence of
an external world. As such, any philosophical argument for the existence of an
external world based on evolutionary theory begs the question against the
radical sceptic (Rorty 1979; Clark 1987). The upshot of this and the previous
argument, claim the critics, is that evolutionary theory cannot defeat scepticism
concerning an external world or inductive justiﬁcation (O’Hear 1997). There
may be other reasons to accept the reality of an external world and the validity
of induction, but the evolutionary account of the origin of induction and
metaphysical realism is not among them.
The EA is weakened by the circularity charge. However, it may not be
necessary to reject it outright. The ﬁrst point to make – a point that is often
overlooked by the critics – is that the circularity criticism does not apply
uniformly to evolutionary justiﬁcations for all innate content and principles. It
would not apply, for instance, to the attempt to justify belief in the existence of
other minds with reference to the evolutionary origin of theory of mind, be-
cause evolutionary theory does not presuppose a belief in other minds. In
addition, evolutionary theory does not pre-suppose any particular view on the
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topics of space, time, or causation, and thus the circularity criticism would not
apply in these domains.
Furthermore, even where the EA does involve circularity (for instance, in the
justiﬁcation of induction and metaphysical realism), this may not always be a
vicious circularity (Vollmer 1987a; Clendinnen 1989; Goldman 1990; Meyers
1990). In some cases, it may be possible to argue that the discovery of innate
mental content reveals a new layer of coherence in the scientiﬁc worldview. If
we assume the validity of the metaphysical assumptions of science, such as the
assumption of an independently existing external world, we then ﬁnd conﬁr-
mation of these assumptions in the evolutionary analysis of our innate or
evolved tendencies of belief. This provides some support for the validity of
these assumptions by showing that the scientiﬁc worldview is at least coherent.
Coherence may not be an adequate criterion for truth, but it is at least a
precondition for the truth of a worldview. This may not seem like much of a
victory, but given that the problem of radical scepticism has haunted Western
philosophy for centuries, and that the problem is commonly viewed as
intractable, it may be the best that can be expected. The EA does not com-
pletely resolve the problem, but this does not mean that it makes no contri-
bution at all.
On the other hand, the coherence argument cannot salvage the evolutionary
justiﬁcation for induction. Even if the innateness of inductive reasoning implies
that induction was useful over the course of our evolution, we have no guar-
antee that it will continue to be useful in the future. Inductive reasoning exists
now purely because it has worked in the past. The problem is not that the
argument is circular; the problem is that an evolutionary account of the origin
of inductive reasoning does not avoid Hume’s challenge. As such, an evolu-
tionary approach to psychology cannot solve the problem of induction.
According to Ruse (1986), the proper Darwinian response is to concede that
inductive reasoning is not ultimately justiﬁable and to give up the attempt.
Nonetheless, if we follow Quine and simply grant the eﬃcacy of induction, it
may still be possible to apply the EA to other innate tendencies of belief. The
conclusions we have reached so far are: (1) that when the application of the EA
involves circularity, the best argument that can be made for accepting the truth
of an innate tendency of belief is that to do so increases the coherence of our
worldview; and (2) that the EA does not always involve circularity.
Innate content and principles are not necessarily accurate
Another criticism of the EA relates to the accuracy of innate mental content
and principles (Stich 1990). In areas in which science has made good progress,
it has become clear that our natural tendencies of belief are often far from
accurate. Many facets of modern science are deeply counterintuitive. In par-
ticular, many aspects of intuitive physics disagree with those of scientiﬁc
physics. Various concepts that in the past were viewed as so certain that they
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were classed as metaphysical necessities have since been overturned by physics.
Nozick (2001) summarizes:
Every event has a cause – gone with the formulation of quantum
mechanics. Space is Euclidian – gone with the formulation of consistent
non-Euclidian geometries and their adoption in contemporary physics.
Space has constant curvature – gone with General Relativity…. For any
two events, one temporally proceeds the other, or the other proceeds it, or
the two are simultaneous – modiﬁed in Special Relativity…. The world
exists in a deﬁnite state independently of our observations – shaken by
quantum mechanics. (p. 133)
In short, it appears that scientiﬁc thinking is more accurate but less natural
to us than other systems of thought (McCauley 2000). This raises an important
question: How could an inaccurate view of the world be maintained in the
process of natural selection? The key to answering this question is to challenge
the assumption, implicit in the EA, that biologically useful beliefs must be
accurate. Many commentators have pointed out that true or highly accurate
beliefs are not always more evolutionarily useful than false beliefs or approx-
imations. Fitness enhancement may result from highly restricted and selective
cognitive mechanisms, and from mechanisms that are subject to error or even
actively and consistently deceptive (Vollmer 1987b; Stich 1990). In short,
usefulness and truth do not always coincide1. This is an important challenge to
the EA, and its implications are considered in the following sections.
Selection for approximate truth
One reason to doubt that accuracy and usefulness will coincide is that selection
often produces psychological mechanisms that yield approximate truth rather
than exact truth. There are various reasons for this. First, adaptations are often
far from optimal. Natural selection does not produce perfection and therefore
may often not produce a close ﬁt between the organism and its environment.
As such, if certain tendencies of belief are adaptations, ‘we should expect a gap
between [these] beliefs and the physical world comparable to that which we ﬁnd
between animal form and ecological niche’ (Campbell 1982, p. 172). An evo-
lutionary perspective leads to the expectation that the mind will exhibit design
ﬂaws, quirks, and ‘bugs’. Of course, people have always realized that the mind
is imperfect; an evolutionary approach simply helps to explain this fact
(Vollmer 1984). What is most signiﬁcant for present purposes, however, is that
we should be wary about inferring accuracy from innateness (O’Hear 1997).
Another reason that selection may favour approximations is that a high
degree of accuracy is often unnecessary. It has been suggested that the only
1Of course, according to a pragmatist account of truth, usefulness and truth coincide as a matter of
deﬁnition. From this perspective, there could be no such thing as an adaptive falsehood (at least not
if usefulness were identiﬁed with evolutionary usefulness).
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things that frogs can perceive are shapes in motion (Lettvin et al. 1959), but
that this is adequate for adaptive action. This shows that simpliﬁcations may
be adaptive and thus that adaptiveness does not necessarily imply accuracy.
We should not expect that selection would construct perfectly accurate beliefs
except where accuracy and simplicity happen to coincide. In addition, an
adequate, fast approximation is likely to be selected over an accurate but
cumbersome calculation (O’Hear 1997). The intuitive human understanding of
the geometry of space provides a suitable illustration. Until recently, it was
believed that Euclid had assembled a set of self-evident, logically necessary
truths about physical space. This tidy picture was shattered by the development
of non-Euclidian geometries and their eventual incorporation into Einstein’s
general theory of relativity (Nerlich 1994). The implication of this transition is
that ‘counter-intuitive non-Euclidian geometry is appropriate for the descrip-
tion of reality and even seems to be more adequate’ (Vollmer 1984, p. 106).
Nonetheless, Euclidian geometry is more closely allied with our common sense
view of space than non-Euclidian geometries, and it is possible that this can be
traced to the evolved design of the mind (Lorenz 1982; Stewart-Williams 2004).
Euclidian geometry is presumably a close enough approximation for the pur-
poses of inclusive ﬁtness. Furthermore, the neural resources required to rep-
resent a more accurate geometry may have made it prohibitively expensive
(Nozick 1993).
Euclidian geometry is a clear example of an intuitively plausible system that
now appears to be false, but it opens up the possibility that there are others.
Nozick (2001) asked whether, like Euclidian phenomenological space, the
concept of truth is a product of evolution but is not strictly accurate. It may be
a part of a folk epistemology, which is imperfect and may disappear if a better
epistemology is devised. Similarly, ‘‘Just as Euclidian geometry need only have
been ‘true enough,’ so too the belief in other minds and in an independently
existing external world could become ﬁxed (via the Baldwin eﬀect) without
being strictly speaking true’’ (Nozick 1993, p. 123). Like the frog’s represen-
tation of the world, these beliefs need only be true enough for genetically useful
action.
Not only may a useful belief be a crude approximation, it may also be an
adaptive falsehood. A number of thinkers have suggested that, in some con-
ditions, selection will favour adaptive biases (Sober 1994; Godfrey-Smith 1996;
Haselton and Buss 2000). For instance, animals may tend to err on the side of
false positives in the identiﬁcation of threats, under the principle that it is better
to mistake a vine for a snake than it is to mistake a snake for a vine. Stephens
(2001) calls this the better-safe-than-sorry principle. In some cases, selection
may also favour false negatives (Godfrey-Smith 1996). For instance, people
may have an evolved tendency to overlook any evidence of goodwill on the
part of outgroup members, under the principle that it is better to be unduly
suspicious than it is to be too trusting of a scheming enemy. More germane to
the present discussion, there are various potential examples of adaptive biases
related to topics in metaphysics. For instance, where there is any ambiguity,
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people may err on the side of assuming the objectivity of our mental states over
subjectivity (Stewart-Williams 2003), and of assuming causation over coinci-
dence (Stewart-Williams and Hill, article submitted for publication). As noted,
the EA does not justify speciﬁc beliefs produced by innate belief-producing
mechanisms but only the general principles underlying these mechanisms.
However, in both of these examples, it seems that the underlying principles are
somewhat skewed. In the ﬁrst example, there is an overestimation of the
likelihood that a mental event has an objective referent; in the second, there is
an overestimation of the extent that events are causally related. Thus, the
principles underlying the respective mechanisms are only approximately true.
The overall conclusion is this: Selection will often favour approximations
rather than precise truths. As such, we cannot safely make inferences from
innate cognitive tendencies to the nature of the world.
How might advocates of the EA respond to this conclusion? To begin with, it
should be noted that advocates are perfectly willing to concede that any innate
contributions to our view of the world are likely to be mere approximations
(Lorenz 1977, 1982; Vollmer 1987b). Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that
there is a danger that the criticism may be used selectively. Critics of the EA
argue that the beliefs embodied in our evolved tendencies of knowledge-pro-
duction are not infallible; however, the evidence of our senses is also not
infallible. If fallibility is an adequate reason to reject innate mental content and
principles as a source of knowledge, then to be consistent, the critics must also
reject sensory information as a source of knowledge. Similarly, the critics argue
that our evolved intuitions (assuming, of course, that we have any) are likely to
be approximations and therefore false given a strict enough criterion. This
certainly seems to be a reasonable assertion, and if advocates of the EA were
committed to the belief that innate ideas are perfectly accurate, their position
would not be salvageable. But this applies equally to all empirical knowledge.
If the approximation argument implies that evolved contributions to our
knowledge must be rejected, it also implies that all scientiﬁc beliefs should be
rejected. We cannot reject innate predilections as a source of knowledge on the
grounds that they are imperfect approximations but then retain other sources
that are equally imperfect. Unless the critics are willing to embrace global
scepticism – which presumably most will not – the approximation criticism
does not provide adequate grounds to reject evolved contributions as a source
of knowledge.
What is the proper response to the approximation criticism? The criticism
may be better viewed as a qualiﬁcation of the EA rather than a refutation. For
example, belief-desire folk psychology may, strictly speaking, be false. None-
theless, it may be more accurate to say that it is true than to say it is false.
(Compare: The earth is not perfectly spherical; nonetheless, it is closer to the
truth to say that it is spherical than to say it is ﬂat.) Similarly, it might be
argued that the common sense notion of causation (the idea that one event is
necessitated by an earlier one) stands at least as a good ﬁrst approximation, as
does the concept of persisting object. I return to this issue later.
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The parochial nature of human knowledge
There is another problem, though. Even if in some cases any innate contri-
butions to our picture of the world can be viewed as approximations, their
approximate accuracy may hold only within a certain narrow range of cir-
cumstances. Newtonian physics is accurate enough to describe our everyday
world but breaks down in extreme conditions, such as in a strong gravitational
ﬁeld or when travelling close to the speed of light (d’Inverno 1992; Taylor and
Wheeler 1992). Similarly, our innate concepts and beliefs may be accurate
enough for adaptive action in a terrestrial environment but break down in
extreme conditions (extreme, that is, relative to the conditions in which we
evolved). Any innate contributions to our view of the world were shaped in a
particular range of environmental circumstances, the environment of our
hunter-gatherer ancestors and pre-human ancestors.2 Consequently, these
contributions may not be reliable outside that range or outside the sphere of
what is biologically relevant (Hahlweg and Hooker 1989a). More broadly, it
might be argued that, when it comes to the abstruse questions dealt with by
philosophers and physicists, our intuitions should probably be given little
weight.
Causal cognition provides a good example. It is probably reasonable to
think that causal cognition is appropriate within the conditions and circum-
stances for which it evolved. In this range of conditions, it may be a close
enough approximation to be biologically useful. However, outside this range, it
may simply be inapplicable. Indeed, intuitive causal cognition appears not to
work at the micro level described by quantum mechanics, where the idea that
every event has a cause appears not to hold. In addition, it is entirely con-
ceivable that causal cognition is not applicable to philosophical questions far
removed from the evolutionary needs of our ancestors. Take, for example, the
question of why there is something rather than nothing. Just as causal cogni-
tion is apparently not applicable at the quantum level, it may not be applicable
to questions such as this. That is, we should be extremely cautious about
accepting that there must be a causal answer to the question of why there is
something rather than nothing. One popular answer to this question is to posit
God as First Cause. However, we cannot rely on the intuition that there must
be an ultimate cause for the universe as a whole. Thus, an important philo-
sophical implication of evolutionary psychology is that it weakens the First
Cause argument for the existence of God.3
2Thus, an epistemological implication of evolutionary psychology is that our view of the world is to
some extent a view of the world in the past.
3I am not arguing that, as a result of our evolutionary origin, humans are constitutionally unable to
answer questions such as why there is something rather than nothing (although maybe we are). All I
am arguing is that our intuitive categories may be inadequate for this task. Rather than ruling out
the possibility of answering these questions, this realization may be a necessary step toward
answering them.
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Like intuitive causal cognition, intuitive physics is only applicable to mid-
size physical entities and processes (Carey and Spelke 1994). Our intuitions
about the physical world do not extend to the very fast (special relativity), the
very large (general relativity), or the very small (quantum physics). Consider
quantum physics. We understand the apparently rational workings of the
human-scale world fairly well. However, Niels Bohr, one of the key players in
the quantum revolution, suggested that the human mind is simply not equipped
to understand the quantum world (O’Hear 1997). Bohr famously suggested
that: ‘Anyone who is not shocked by quantum mechanics hasn’t understood it.’
This quotation captures the fact that quantum mechanics does not square with
intuitive physics. According to an early interpretation of quantum phenomena,
there is discontinuity in the motion of subatomic entities (Miller 1987), con-
trary to the common sense intuition that motion is continuous (Spelke 1990).
As Lorenz (1982) dryly noted: ‘It is as though the ‘‘measure of all things’’ was
simply too coarse and too approximate for these ﬁner spheres of measurement’
(p. 134).
The strangeness (to us) of quantum physics, and of relativity theory, is
consistent with an evolutionary origin for speciﬁc components of our intuitive
view of matter, space, time, and gravity. Indeed, the fact that these theories
seem strange to us is explained by an evolutionary approach to the mind
(Vollmer 1984). However, an evolutionary approach is inconsistent with the
view that innate content or principles are even approximately true outside the
range of circumstances associated with our cognitive evolution. Based on
considerations such as these, Hahlweg and Hooker (1989a) reached the fol-
lowing conclusion:
Bioepistemology provides philosophers with a tool for criticism. The
message is: Don’t trust your perceptual and conceptual structures once
you leave the safe grounds of everyday experience; criticize even the most
basic presupposition such as our concepts of causation, of induction, our
space-time framework, and even our logic. Therefore the main function
of bioepistemology is to assist us in freeing ourselves from anthropo-
centric preconceptions of which we may not be aware. (p. 29)
Can the EA be salvaged? Again, the criticism that innate content and
principles are only locally applicable may be best viewed not as a refutation of
the EA but instead as a reﬁnement (albeit a rather signiﬁcant reﬁnement). We
have no reason to assume the accuracy of innate tendencies of thought in
matters beyond the sphere of everyday life. However, within the range of their
applicability, the EA might yet work. So, for example, if we wish to justify our
concept of causation on the grounds that it has an evolutionary origin, our
conclusion must be restricted to the sphere and scale of reality relevant to
human cognitive evolution. Just as our understanding of causation breaks
down at the quantum level, our intuitive understanding of induction and the
external world may break down at this level too. But this is not to deny that
our understanding in these domains represents a valid approximation at the
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macroscopic level. The most accurate view of the universe may come from
maintaining our evolved concepts and tendencies of belief, but keeping in mind
the limited range of their application. This may be a better approach than
either rejecting them altogether or accepting them without the proviso.
Evolutionary justiﬁcations have implausible consequences
A third criticism of the evolutionary approach to the justiﬁcation of knowledge
is that, if taken to its natural conclusion, it has certain highly implausible
consequences. The EA appears to amount to the assertion that we should
accept our intuitions as local approximations as long as it can be shown that
they trace to the evolved design of the mind. This produces plausible results in
some cases. For instance, if causal cognition were not at least somewhat
accurate, it is diﬃcult to see how it could have been crafted by natural selec-
tion. However, in other cases, the EA is not so plausible. An example relates to
the philosophical issue of the relationship of mind to brain. Mind–brain
dualism appears to be more intuitively plausible for most people than monistic
approaches such as identity theory or functionalism. This intuition may trace
to the evolved nature of the mind/brain. Various commentators have proposed
that we have separate evolved mental mechanisms for thinking about physical
bodies and for thinking about minds (e.g., Leslie 1994). This may help explain
the initial plausibility and perennial popularity of dualism, and why physicalist
theories seem so implausible to people. But if the EA implies that our intuitive
predilection for mind–brain dualism provides support for dualism, then the EA
is on shaky ground. After all, many modern philosophers reject mind–brain
dualism (Dennett 1991), and this is particularly so among evolutionary epis-
temologists (Hahlweg and Hooker 1989b).
It seems that in some cases, the EA furnishes reasonable conclusions, but in
others, it does not. This casts a shadow of doubt on its reliability. The argu-
ment must be rejected – unless, that is, we can ﬁnd a principled reason to reject
our philosophical predilections related to issues such as the mind–brain rela-
tionship but retain those related to issues such as causation. The key to doing
this may be found in the fact that the capacity for causal cognition is plausibly
innate, whereas our intuitive stand on the mind–brain issue is not. The latter
may be intuitively compelling to us as an indirect result of the innate design of
the mind (i.e., the fact that we have separate evolved mechanisms for reasoning
about the physical vs. the mental), but it is not itself innate. This is an
important diﬀerence. If we accept that the capacity for causal cognition is an
adaptation, we have some reason to think that the principles implicit in this
form of cognition are accurate – after all, if it were not, the capacity would not
have been selected. In contrast, if our ‘Cartesian intuitions’ are simply a
selectively neutral artefact of the functional specialization of the human brain,
there is no reason to think that they need to be useful or accurate. We must add
another stipulation to the EA: It applies only to innate content crafted by
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natural selection and not to ideas that are simply intuitively compelling as an
indirect result of the innate design of the human mind.
However, even if we restrict our attention to content and principles that are
directly innate, the EA still has some implausible consequences. Evolutionary
psychologists maintain that some components of moral psychology and of our
moral beliefs have an evolutionary origin (Trivers 1971; Alexander 1987; Pe-
trinovich et al. 1993; Krebs 1998). But would we want to argue that this
provides any assurance that our moral beliefs are literally true, or that an
analysis of the innate contribution to these beliefs would provide us with
knowledge of objective moral truths? Many thinkers would ﬁnd this position
unpalatable. After all, moral beliefs are a good candidate for beliefs that confer
an evolutionary advantage but are false (Joyce 2001).
Given that many thinkers doubt the very existence of objective moral truths,
the fact that the EA implies that any innate moral beliefs are objectively true
must lead us to question whether the EA is valid. And if one is not too troubled
by the notion of objective moral values, consider aesthetic tastes instead. Some
standards of physical beauty used in mate choice appear to have an evolutionary
origin (Buss 1989; Jones 1996; Gangestad and Thornhill 1997; Shackelford and
Larsen 1997, 1999), as do landscape preferences (Kaplan 1992; Orians and
Heerwagen 1992; Thornhill 1998). The evolutionary function of these prefer-
ences is not related to any objective facts about what is beautiful, and indeed
there is no reason to think that there are such facts. However, if the evolutionary
origin of, say, the belief in other minds counts as proof of the objectivity of other
minds, then presumably the evolutionary origin of our aesthetic preferences
must count as proof of the objectivity of our aesthetic preferences. Again, when
pressed, the EA has implausible consequences. These consequences of the EA
seem to show, by reductio ad absurdum, that the argument is false.
With some further qualiﬁcations, however, it may once again be possible to
salvage the argument. The key is a consideration of the purposes for which
diﬀerent components of our psychology evolved. In the case of innate content
and principles related to causation, space, time, and the existence of an external
world and other minds, the evolutionary advantage presumably relates to the
accuracy of our understanding of the world. The evolutionary advantages of
our moral beliefs and aesthetic preferences, however, are unrelated to their
objective truth or falsity. The evolutionary explanation of innate inﬂuences on
our moral beliefs, for example, revolves solely around the eﬀects that these
have on the way we treat one another. From an evolutionary perspective, it
does not matter how much or how little our moral beliefs correspond to any
objective moral truths, even if such truths existed.4 This type of functional
4It might be objected that the evolutionary utility of folk psychology also revolves around how we
treat one another. The diﬀerence is, however, that behaviour prompted by folk psychology is
presumably useful only to the extent that our understanding of other people is accurate, whereas
the usefulness of our moral beliefs is unrelated to their objective truth or falsity.
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analysis provides a principled approach to distinguishing which aspects of our
innate psychology can provide knowledge of the world and which cannot. We
can ask this question: If the objective facts were diﬀerent, would natural
selection still favour the same tendency of belief? If the answer is ‘no,’ we have
some reason to think that the belief in question is at least approximately true.
On the other hand, if the answer is ‘yes,’ then an evolutionary psychological
perspective oﬀers no reason to think that the belief is true. In principle, it may
be, but the mere fact that we have an inherited tendency to think it true is no
proof that it actually is.
Application and implications of the EA
Where does this leave us? Many of the ideas emerging from metaphysics
challenge our intuitive views, as do the ideas emerging from modern science.
Given that science contradicts our intuitions in the scientiﬁc realm, what rea-
son do we have to trust our intuitions in the realm of metaphysics? This might
sound like a rhetorical question, but in this section, I will attempt to ﬁnd an
answer. Although science and metaphysics both make counterintuitive claims,
there is an important diﬀerence between the two areas. Whereas in science
there is at least some consensus about the progress we have made and the
direction we are headed, metaphysics is notorious for its lack of established
ﬁndings. If metaphysicians were able to resolve controversies and reach con-
sensus through the methods they presently use, then we would probably be
wise to bow to their expertise, regardless of whether their conclusions squared
with our evolved intuitions. It is not clear, though, that such progress has been
made. Given this state of aﬀairs, it seems reasonable to propose a new method
for metaphysics, a method that involves taking the EA seriously. In this sec-
tion, I draw together the strands from the previous discussion and describe
how to apply and interpret the EA.
When is the EA applicable?
The ﬁrst step in applying the EA is to ascertain which beliefs and principles are
potential candidates for justiﬁcation by the EA. For the reasons already dis-
cussed, the EA should only be applied when dealing with content that is innate,
as opposed to content that is merely intuitively appealing as an indirect result
of the innate design of the mind. Furthermore, it should only be applied when
the evolutionary function of the innate content is plausibly dependent on its
(approximate) correspondence with the external world. These stipulations
immediately rule out a number of pivotal topics in metaphysics. Consider, for
instance, whether the EA can be used to justify a belief in God. The ﬁrst
question would be whether belief in God is innate or merely intuitively
appealing as an indirect result of the innate design of the mind. Although some
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have argued for the former position (e.g., Hamer 2004), a good case can be
made that the concept of God is simply intuitively appealing as a by-product of
an innate tendency toward anthropomorphic explanations and interpretations
of the world (Guthrie 1994). If this is the case, then the EA is not applicable.
On the other hand, if the belief does turn out to have an innate basis, it has
passed the ﬁrst hurdle. The next question would be whether it depends for its
evolutionary usefulness on its approximate correspondence with the external
world. Most explanations for the innateness of the belief in God revolve
around the eﬀects of this belief on people’s well-being or on social cohesion
(Wilson 2002; Hamer 2004). But such explanations do not require the existence
of God in order to work. For these reasons, belief in God is not a candidate for
a belief that can be justiﬁed by the EA. Contrary to Descartes, the innateness of
the concept of God would not constitute evidence for the existence of God.
In many other cases, though, the initial demands will be met. Whenever this
is the case, we must next ask whether the application of the EA to a given
aspect of innate mental content is circular. If it is, then the best that can be
achieved is to employ the coherence argument: We can tentatively assume the
accuracy of the content in question because doing so increases the coherence of
our worldview. This argument applies, for instance, to the justiﬁcation of belief
in an external world, and provides a partial answer to the radical sceptic. If, on
the other hand, there is no circularity, the interpretation of the EA is very
diﬀerent.
First approximations and ﬁnal approximations
Where the use of the EA is appropriate and non-circular, its main implication
is that, in matters where science has not progressed beyond evolved intuitions,
our evolved knowledge provides a good ﬁrst approximation (at least within the
sphere of reality in which our cognitive evolution took place). Furthermore,
where science cannot speak, our evolved knowledge may also have to serve as a
ﬁnal approximation.5 This position contains an answer to the question of how,
if we know that our intuitions related to topics in science are inaccurate, we can
put any faith in our intuitions related to topics in metaphysics. Granted, even
the most intuitively compelling theory of common sense may be wrong. The
problem is, though, that beyond this conclusion, we are left with little guidance
in choosing among philosophical theories. Without evidence to guide a change
in belief, we would have no idea in which direction we should change it. Even if
we agree that an intuitive theory may be inaccurate – indeed, is almost certain
to be inaccurate – this does not imply that a counterintuitive theory will be
more accurate. Our beliefs may be closer to the truth if we hold an intuitive
5The latter circumstance applies to topics in metaphysics almost as a matter of deﬁnition, which
hints at the potential importance of the EA for the discipline of metaphysics.
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false belief than if we hold a counterintuitive false belief. The EA will not lead
us to perfectly accurate beliefs, but it may help us to choose the least inaccurate
ones available to us.
Further guidance in interpreting the EA comes from the observation that,
although science has reached many counterintuitive conclusions, our intuitive
predilections tend to make sense in light of these conclusions, and it is generally
apparent how the unreﬁned intuition could be an adequate approximation. For
instance, Newton’s ﬁrst law of motion (which states that objects continue in
their state of motion or rest unless acted on by a force) contradicts the intuition
that the natural state of an object is to be at rest and that all motion requires
the ongoing application of force (Resnick 1994). However, the usefulness of the
intuition makes sense in light of the scientiﬁc understanding of friction. The
Aristotelian conception of the physical universe is a more accurate description
of our phenomenological world than is Newton’s conception, due to the per-
vasive inﬂuence of friction (Stewart and Cohen 1997). Another example: Sci-
ence has reached the counterintuitive conclusion that matter consists mainly of
empty space, and that we perceive ‘a continuous ﬂux of forces and events in
terms of stable and enduring material objects’ (O’Hear 1997, p. 57). However,
our intuitive conception of matter is perfectly consistent with the way matter
appears to us at the macrocosmic level: as solid, stable, and continuous. The
lesson is that we should be extremely suspicious of any philosophical theory
that, rather than reﬁning our evolved intuitions, directly and completely con-
tradicts them, unless the theory explains how these intuitions could be evolu-
tionarily useful approximations. Until that time, we are justiﬁed in accepting
innate beliefs and principles as local ﬁrst approximations. More generally, the
standard of evidence required for accepting philosophical positions that defy
innate intuitions should be much higher than the standard of evidence required
for accepting positions that are consistent with these intuitions.
These recommendations may sound like mere truisms when stated in the
abstract – according to a reviewer of this article, they amount to little more
than the assertion that we should be sceptical of views that go against our
intuitions, especially when we cannot explain the usefulness of the intuitions
they discount. Even if this characterization were accepted, it might be argued
that it is nonetheless a valuable result. After all, the EA provides an argument
for these truisms, an argument founded on one of the most successful scientiﬁc
theories ever devised. In any case, there are good reasons to dispute the idea
that the EA leads only to truistic conclusions. The reviewer’s summary missed
one crucial point: The conclusions apply only to innate mental content and the
principles underlying innate psychological mechanisms, and only when the
evolutionary signiﬁcance of the content or principles derives from its approx-
imate correspondence with the external world. The EA oﬀers no support for
appeals to intuition on a number of issues, including the relationship of mind
to brain, the existence of objective moral truths, and the existence of God. In
these and other cases, the EA is at odds with the truism that we should be
sceptical of beliefs that go against our intuitions. In short, the EA does not
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simply justify appeals to intuition. It speciﬁes conditions in which appeals to
intuition are appropriate but also speciﬁes conditions in which they are not.
Furthermore, the implications of the EA may seem less truistic when we stop
considering them at a general level and instead consider speciﬁc examples of
the argument’s application. In some cases, the EA may urge conclusions that
are far from popular among philosophers. One example concerns the corre-
spondence theory of truth – the much-maligned notion that a statement or
belief is true to the extent that it corresponds to the facts. Our innate con-
ception of truth, if we possess one, is most plausibly something akin to cor-
respondence theory (Goldman 1999; Nozick 2001). Therefore, the EA would
justify accepting this view as a ﬁrst (and perhaps ﬁnal) approximation. Of
course, innate content and principles are not necessarily accurate, and there-
fore it is perfectly possible that the notion of correspondence does not perfectly
capture the nature of truth. But although innate ideas are not necessarily
accurate, the reﬁnements made to them tend not to completely reverse them –
they leave room to understand how the initial version was a useful ﬁrst
approximation. Coherence, pragmatic, and deﬂationist theories of truth, rather
than reﬁning correspondence theory, completely refute it. As such, if the notion
of correspondence truth has an innate basis, we should be extremely suspicious
of the alternative theories. The standard of evidence and argument required in
support of these approaches to truth should be much higher than that required
for correspondence theory. On the other hand, if the notion of correspondence
truth does not have an innate basis, correspondence theory would not enjoy a
privileged position in relation to any other theory of truth, despite the fact that
it is the common sense position.
If taken seriously, the EA could have an important impact on the agenda of
philosophy. The EA points us toward where our philosophical eﬀorts are best
placed. For example, it suggests that, given our present understanding, eﬀorts
to justify correspondence approaches to truth are less likely to be a waste of
one’s time than are eﬀorts to justify deﬂationist theories. Similarly, eﬀorts to
devise realist theories of causation, space, and time are less likely to be mis-
placed than are eﬀorts to devise antirealist theories in these domains. (In
contrast, the EA has no such implications for realist vs. antirealist accounts of
moral truths.) Admittedly, the evolutionary approach does not locate the faults
in arguments for conclusions that defy innate intuitions. At the very least,
though, the approach points us to the task of ﬁnding such faults, and it sug-
gests that this will probably be more fruitful than looking for faults in con-
clusions that are consistent with innate intuitions. In providing this guidance,
the EA helps to set the agenda for philosophy and philosophers.
Going beyond evolved intuitions
The next matter to consider is how we might proceed beyond our evolved
intuitions. The development of atomic physics in the ﬁrst third of the
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20th century provides a good example of a successful transition from
intuitive starting points to a highly counterintuitive theory. Miller (1987)
pointed out that Rutherford’s initial model of the atom as a miniature
solar system was based on intuitions such as object permanence – intu-
itions that plausibly have an evolutionary origin (Stewart-Williams 2003).
Bohr’s 1913 model was less intuitive: Although still visualizable, it in-
cluded the counterintuitive notion of electrons making quantum leaps,
which deﬁes the intuitive principle that objects occupy linked regions of
space and time (Spelke 1990). It was not until 1925 that Heisenberg ﬁ-
nally dropped the notion of visualizable solar system atoms (Miller 1987).
This provides a good model for how to proceed from intuitive to coun-
terintuitive judgements: cautiously and only if the evidence genuinely
seems to demand it.
A promising method of progressing beyond intuitive starting points involves
linking innate mental content to current scientiﬁc knowledge. Research on
disgust has revealed that, when an object classed as a contaminant touches
another object, people typically view the latter object as contaminated also.
The degree of contamination is independent of the length of contact – even the
slightest touch transmits it completely. This ancient adaptation matches a fact
about the world that is invisible to us and was only recently discovered: the fact
that germs multiply and therefore that even the slightest contact can soon
result in complete contamination (Boyer 2000). This is an example of how parts
of our construal of the world that were previously inexplicable can make sense
as science uncovers aspects of nature that natural selection has been ﬁtting our
minds to, but which we had not dreamed existed. It would be naı¨ve to assume
that all innate content simply depicts reality as it is. However, it may be rea-
sonable to make the weaker assumption that such content corresponds to
something in reality. We might look to science for suggestions as to what that
something might be.
By way of illustration, consider causal cognition. To what feature of reality
might this cognitive competency be adapted? A number of evolutionary epis-
temologists have suggested that the answer to this question is energy transfer
(Lorenz 1982; Vollmer 1984). As Lorenz (1982) put it: ‘The essence of ‘propter
hoc’ which alone diﬀerentiates it qualitatively from a ‘uniform post hoc’ lies in
the fact that cause and eﬀect are successive links in the inﬁnite chain of phe-
nomenal forms that energy assumes in the course of its everlasting existence’
(p. 138). So, for instance, we would say that the collision of one billiard ball
with another causes the second ball to move, because this sequence of events
involves a transfer of energy (in particular, kinetic energy). In contrast, we
would not say that the rooster crowing causes the sun to rise, because this
sequence does not involve energy transfer. I am not suggesting that this
interpretation of causation is necessarily correct; it is not clear, for example,
that mental causation can be understood in terms of energy transfer. However,




There are various directions that future work in this area might proﬁtably take.
First, cross-species research may provide further data concerning whether any
given example of innate mental content accurately depicts the world. The more
widespread any innate mental content is in the animal kingdom, the better a
candidate it is for knowledge rather thanmere belief. For example, if the concept
of God has an evolutionary origin in human beings (which is far from certain), it
is presumably only found inmembers of our species. As such, we would have less
conﬁdence that this aspect of mind relates to an objective reality than we would
have in the case of a more widespread innate tendency, such as the tendency to
construe the world in terms of objects situated in three-dimensional space.
Cross-species commonalities in innate mental content may be a product of a
common origin or of convergent evolution. The products of convergent evo-
lution would be more convincing candidates for genuine innate knowledge. An
analogy can be drawn between convergent evolution and convergence as a
criterion for truth in science. Where there is convergence in scientiﬁc research
and theory, we can be more conﬁdent that our theories are zeroing in on an
accurate view of some part of reality. Similarly, if it could be shown that some
aspect of the cognitive systems of various diﬀerent species was a product of
convergent evolution, this would provide stronger evidence that this aspect
corresponds to reality than would innateness in a group of species that
inherited it from a common ancestor.
Another principle that could be exploited in future research is this: The more
ancient a cognitive adaptation is, the more accurate it is likely to be. This is
because longer standing adaptations have, in a manner of speaking, resisted
falsiﬁcation for longer. Many animals appear to have cognitive adaptations
related to physical objects (Wynne 2001), which suggests that adaptations that
mesh with the physical world are very ancient. They have been subjected to a
longer period of selection than more recent cognitive adaptations, such as
theory of mind, which may mean that they have been honed to a greater degree
and are more reliable. This may help to explain why the physical sciences are
better established and more advanced than the psychological sciences.6 Finally,
the development of mass society is too recent to be associated with any com-
plex psychological adaptations. Consequently, human beings may tend to be
poor intuitive sociologists.
Conclusion
There are an unlimited number of possible theories, most of which are wrong,
and although any evolved contributions to our view of the world are also likely
6On the other hand, this could simply be because the physical level of analysis happens to be
simpler and more predictable than the psychological.
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to be wrong, we may get closer to the truth by accepting these contributions as
ﬁrst approximations than by simply rejecting them, at least in the absence of
compelling reasons to do so. Furthermore, where science cannot speak, our
ﬁrst approximations may also have to stand as ﬁnal approximations. This
argument can only be applied in the case of innate content or principles that
are dependent on their approximate correspondence with the external world,
and only within the sphere in which cognitive evolution took place. Evolu-
tionary theory does not solve the problem of induction or contribute to
questions such as the relationship of mind to brain, the existence of objective
moral truths, or the existence of God. Nonetheless, it may contribute to var-
ious other problems in philosophy. An evolutionary account of belief in an
external world provides some support for the existence of such a world by
increasing the coherence of the scientiﬁc worldview. The EA also provides a
partial solution to the problem of other minds, and suggests that innate content
related to space, time, causation, and truth may serve as a good ﬁrst approx-
imations, at least within the range of circumstances of our cognitive evolution.
Although the EA must be carefully qualiﬁed, it seems reasonable to think that,
in some circumstances, innate ideas can be viewed as a naturalistic source of
metaphysical knowledge.
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